An analysis of panel data on individuals in a random selection of urban households in Ethiopia reveals large, sustained, and unexplained earnings gaps between public and private, and formal and informal sectors over the period [1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004]. We have no formal evidence whether these gaps reflect segmentation of the labor market along either of these divides. In other words, we cannot show whether they are at least in part due to impediments to entry to the higher wage sector. However, we do have evidence that, if segmentation explains any part of the observed earnings gaps, then it could only have weakened over the survey decade. We find, first, that the rate of mobility increased between the two pairs of sectors. Sample transition rates grew across survey waves, while state dependence in sector choice decreased. Second, the sensitivity of sector choice to earnings gaps increased over the same period. In particular, the role of comparative earnings in selection into the informal sector was evident through out the survey decade and increased in magnitude over the second half of the period.
Introduction 1
In this paper we investigate the extent to which the structure of Ethiopia's urban labor market might have changed since the early 1990s by looking at changes in the rate of workers' mobility across sectors, in sectoral earnings gaps, and in the sensitivity of mobility rates to earnings differentials. The aim is to see if these have changed in ways consistent with the market getting more or less segmented in the sense of the existence of entry barriers to relatively high paying sectors of employment. Our analysis is based on data from the 1994 to 2004 waves of the Ethiopia Urban Household Socio Economic Survey of the Addis Ababa University and the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 2 There are good enough theoretical reasons and anecdotes that could lead us to suspect that urban labor markets in low-income economies like Ethiopia's are segmented along the lines indicated in this paper. At the same time, there is consensus that the hypothesis of segmentation is difficult, if not impossible, to test formally in datasets like the one available to us. 3 We nonetheless think that the hypothesis provides a useful framework with the help of which one can analyze changes in the structure of labor markets.
Although we cannot directly test its fundamental prediction that there are barriers to entry to certain sectors of the labor market, we can still interpret time series of mobility rates and wage gaps or the relationships thereof as indications of whether labor markets are getting more or less flexible. In other words, absent the possibility of segmentation, these same data would not be as interesting in terms of their implications for the structure or functioning of the market.
Segmentation is indicated whenever there are persistent sector wage premiums that are unexplained in the sense that we cannot attribute them to selectivity or to differences in comparative advantage, unmeasured ability, job attributes or taste. 4 One hypothesized 1 This paper is based on an earlier version prepared as part of a World Bank study of Ethiopia's urban labor markets (World Bank, 2007) . We thank Jeni Klugman and Caterina Laderchi , for very useful comments on that and a subsequent version as well as for the support and guidance they provided to our work on the paper. 2 As discussed in greater detail in section 2 these data are not statistically representative of labor market indicators for urban areas in Ethiopia as a whole. Those can be found, together with a thorough discussion of different labor market data sources for Ethiopia in World Bank (2007) . 3 Although the balance of studies has so far found evidence against the segmentation hypothesis, almost everyone rejecting it are quick to point out serious limitations of data or methods used in the analysis. 4 Dickens and Lang (1985) define segmentation in terms of the interrelated phenomena of sustained and unexplained wage premiums arising from endogenous wage rigidities and the non-price rationing of "primary-sector" or high-wage jobs arising from it. Magnac (1991) defines a segmented labor instance of it is between formal sector wage employment and own account work or informal sector employment. 5 A second is between public sector employees and private sector wage earners. 6 If segmentation does indeed exist along either of these divides, then it is also possible that some proportion of the unemployed have been rationed out of paid jobs or out of self-employment by non-price factors.
Existing formal tests of segmentation rely on a host of restrictive assumptions including the log normality of potential earnings and the absence of state dependence in mobility costs, tastes and skills. 7 No attempt is therefore made in this paper to carry out any such tests, or formally establish if Ethiopia's urban labor market is segmented. 8 Instead, we look at changes in variables that define segmentation with a view to assessing whether these changes would have strengthened or reduced it if it in fact existed over the survey period. Unexplained and non-compensating wage differentials that cannot be attributed to differences in comparative advantage or to selectivity are sustainable only if the market as one in which a) rewards vary across sectors for equally productive workers and b) wages are rigid at least in one (-presumably the high-paying) sector of the labor market as a state in which equally productive worker are rewarded. 5 The classic story of segmentation along the formal vs. informal dichotomy is Fields' (1975) extension of the Harris -Todaro (1970) model of an underdeveloped economy's labor market quantity-adjusting to shocks through changes in unemployment and rural-to-urban migration in the face of wage-rigidity. Stiglitz (1974) , Shapiro and Stigliz (1984) and Bulow and Summers (1985) provide efficiency wage explanations to the wage-rigidity assumed in the Harris-Todaro model. The extension by Fields introduces job search costs that rural-to-urban migrants financed by entering a low wage, low productivity no-barrier-to entry sector upon arrival to towns. Both entry barriers and wage premiums are essential features of Fields' model of segmentation. Rauch (1991) provides an alternative occupational-choice-cum-industrial-organization perspective to the modelling of the duality between the formal and the informal sectors of the economy. Although the dichotomy in Rauch's model is defined in terms of departures from an optimal size distribution of firms rather than from an optimal distribution of workers and earnings per se, it also arises from (government imposed) price rigidity in the labor market. 6 The large body of empirical work comparing pay rates between the two sectors is overwhelmingly focused on advanced economies, and is concerned not so much with labor market segmentation as with the import of pay gaps to public finances or to the ability of government agencies to attract skilled workers. There has nonetheless been significant interest in public vs. private sector wage gaps in developing economies as well, partly out of similar policy concern as in advanced economies (e.g. Stevenson, 1992; Heller and Tait, 1994) , and also in the context of testing the segmentation hypothesis (Lindauer, 1991) . Examples include Lindaur and Sabot (1983) on Tanzania, Van der Gaag and Vijerberg (1988) on Cote d'Ivoire, Terrel on Haiti (1993) , and Nielsen and Rosholm (2001) on Zambia.
Regardless of their sign, unexplained and non-compensating public sector pay premia would be indicative of segmentation, since mobility must be impeded in one direction or the other for them to exist.
7 Heckman and Hotz (1986) and Magnac (1991) discuss the assumptions in the context of the switching regression test proposed in Dickens and Lang (1985) . 8 On balance empirical studies of labor market studies on middle income developing economies reject the segmentation hypothesis. See, for example, Magnac (1991) Given that the rate of workers' mobility is usually highly correlated with the size of sectoral earnings gaps, the change in the earnings gap itself is a second (alternative)
indicator of change in the degree of segmentation. A third alternative indicator is change in the sensitivity of sector choice to earnings gaps. The less sensitive is state (or sector) choice to pay gaps, the more likely it is that mobility into the higher paying sector has been impeded. To look at these second set of indicators, we compute sector earnings differentials based on estimated sector specific earnings equations. The sensitivity of 9 For completeness one could also estimate a separate model of binary choice into formal private sector employment. However, the estimation would not add information to that the models of choice into unemployment, informal sector employment and public sector employment provide between them. 10 Heckman and Hotz (1985) highlight the distinction between mobility costs and entry barriers as an important issues in testing for segmentation. 11 Maloney (1999) is probably the first to make use of mobility data in conjunction with post transition changes in earnings to test for segmentation. Gong and van Soest (2002) build on this idea to jointly model earnings and inter-sectoral mobility and estimate state dependence in sector choice as one of the test parameters of segmentation. Although we borrow from these two papers the idea of using mobility data, our goal here is less ambitious than theirs since we are not seeking to test for segmentation directly. We are in fact side stepping the task of testing for segmentation, while asking whether our data are consistent with becoming more or less pronounced over the period of observation.
sector choice to earnings gaps is estimated as a parameter of a dynamic structural sector choice model.
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Our estimates imply large earnings differentials between the public and the private sectors of wage employment. In the absence of direct evidence on impediments to mobility, these differentials would not necessarily imply segmentation. Still, they should make the hypothesis of segmentation more credible in the Ethiopian context than it would otherwise be. At the same time, the sensitivity of sector choice to earnings gaps seems to have gone up in more recent waves of the survey, not only between the private and the public sectors of wage employment, but also between formal sector wage employment and the informal sector. In particular, the role of relative earnings in selection into the informal sector seems to have gone up substantially.
These results suggest that, if Ethiopia's urban labor market is indeed segmented along the public vs. private or formal vs. informal sector dichotomies, it has got less and less so since 1994. The raw transition matrices we compute from the survey sample support this conclusion as do the parameters of the dynamic sector choice models that we have estimated on the same dataset. We see from the raw transition matrices that, although The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section we describe our data. Section 3 discusses patterns and rates of mobility across states in terms of raw transition matrices. Section 4 describes our estimation and testing framework. We present results of estimation of (reduced form) dynamic sector choice models in Section 5, and those of their structural counterparts in Section 6. We conclude in Section 7.
Data
The first wave of the Ethiopia Urban Household Socio Economic Survey took place in 1994. There have been four waves since then, one in each of the years 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004. Some 9,000 to 10,000 individuals in 1500 to 1600 households were covered in each of these waves. A major point of strength of the dataset generated by the survey is that it has a sizeable panel component. A significant proportion of the individuals covered in the first wave were also tracked by all four subsequent waves. An even higher proportion of them were covered by at least three waves. A weakness is that the survey samples were drawn exclusively from the country's seven largest urban centers. While these account for the bulk of the urban sector of the economy, we would hesitate to project details of our results to the broader (national) urban labor market. The smaller towns may differ in terms of their labor market structure from the major centers covered by the survey. That said, we would be surprised if the more qualitative aspects of our conclusions did not hold by and large for the urban sector countrywide. between those who had no education, those who had attained grade 10 or lower, those who had completed preparatory school, and those who had some tertiary education.
Other covariates highlighted in the analysis include location of employment, ethnicity and family background variables, including parental schooling and parental occupation.
Aggregate transition rates and patterns
As a prelude to our analysis of the determinants of labor mobility, we describe in this section the patterns of mobility observed in the data in terms of sample transition matrices between employment and unemployment, and across three sectors of employment, namely, the public sector, formal private sector employment, and informal sector employment.
13 There is no employer size dimension to our definition of informality. People who have reported to be employees of a private sector organization or enterprise have all been classified here as formal sector workers. It is common to define informality in a way that takes into account the size of employers. There are a variety of operational definitions of informality with which our admittedly lose characterization is consistent. One definition identifies informality with lack of labor regulation (Pratap and Quintin, 2006) . A second is in terms of employer size (Maloney 1999, Gong, van Soest and Villagomez, 2004) . A third is in terms of the kind of work being done such as casual or piece rate work and also own account work, such as casual work or self employment (Magnac, 1991) . A fourth alternative is to define firms as informal if they are not legally registered (Bigsten, Kimuyu, Lundvall, 2004) There was not much transition across these sectors between the 1994 wave and the 1995 wave, or between the 1995 wave and the 1997 wave. On the other hand, transition rates were relatively high between the 1994 wave and the 1997 wave, the 1997 wave and the 2000 wave, and the 2000 wave and 2004 wave, and, as expected, even higher between any pair of waves that were further apart by more than four years. We report the sample transition matrices for these pairings in table 3. Two key patterns seem to emerge across the four waves. First, there was a small but statistically significant and persistent decline in the sample unemployment rate since the 1997 wave. Secondly, this was associated with an increase in the share of formal sector in employment.
Unemployment transitions
The probability of someone reporting unemployment in the 1994 sample landing a job or shifting to self-employment within a year was almost zero. However, the probability of someone in that state exiting unemployment increases as we expand the time horizon of observation. Panel a) of 
Informal sector/self-employment transitions
Like rates of transitions out of unemployment, probabilities of transitions between the formal and informal sectors of employment would seem to be negligible over any given year. But, again, the probability of transition rises significantly when we expand the time horizon by three more years (table 3, panel b). This is largely on account of movement of workers to the private formal sector. The probability that someone reporting selfemployment or informal employment in the 1994 survey would have joined the public sector by the 2000 survey was only 5 %. The probability that the same individual would have taken up a job in a private firm was about 15 %. These probabilities do not change much as we expand the horizon further to 10 years (table 3, panel c).
14 Other related transition rates of interest for the years 2000-2004 are the following: About 24 % of the unemployed of 2000 sample landed formal sector jobs by 2004; another 17 % became selfemployed, or entered into informal job contracts; some 13 % joined private firms; about 11 % joined the public sector. To illustrate the origins of the unemployed, some 17 % of those who were out of the labor force in the 2000 sample joined the unemployment pool by 2004 (table 3, panel e). Given that the out-of-the-labor force group is by far the largest category of survey respondents in any year, this suggests that fresh entry into the labor force must be the largest source of entry into unemployment in the economies from which the sample was drawn. The second largest source were private sector job losses were the second important source of gross addition to employment for the same period. The probability of a formal private sector job loss was 14 %. The probability of an informal sector job loss was even higher at 17%. This contrasts with 7-8 % rate of public sector job losses. Given that there were more private sector employees than there were public sector workers in the 2000 sample, a larger proportion of the unemployed of 2004 must have come from the private sector than did from the public sector.
To see if the rate of mobility from informal sector employment to formal sector jobs has 15
Public sector transitions
There was a 48% chance that someone who worked for the government (as opposed to a state owned company) in the 1994 sample would have left that particular sector by 2004.
We arrive at this rate by adding the following probabilities from panel c: that the person retired or otherwise left the labor force (20.5%); that they were laid off or pensioned off but did not leave the labor force (10%); and that they joined the private sector (17%).
More than half of those who moved to the private sector would have worked for a formal sector firm. The corresponding probabilities of transition for a public enterprise worker were: 35% of leaving the labor force, 10% of being unemployed, and 16% of joining the private sector. Two-thirds of those joining the private sector would have joined a formal sector firm.
These rates reflect more the higher transition probabilities of the intervals between the fourth and fifth (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) and the third and fourth (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) waves of the survey (panel d and panel e) than the rates of the first three waves. As can be seen from panel a there was practically no movement from the public sector during the interval between the first and the third waves (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) . On the other hand, there was a 12 % chance that someone who was a government employee in 2000 would have joined the private sector in self-employment (4 %) or as an employee (8%) . These rates are much larger than the probability of transition from the formal sector. Because the combined share of the out-of-the labor force and the unemployed was 60% of the full sample of individuals in the 2000 sample, this means that by far the largest fraction of those who joined the informal sector by 2004 could only have come from these sources. Indeed, the probability that anyone who had a formal sector job in the 2000 sample would be found in self employment or in informal paid jobs in 2004 was quite low, standing at 6% for a government worker, at 8% for a public enterprise employee, and at 12 % for an employee of a private firm.
public enterprise employee in the 2000 sample moving to the private sector by 2004 was even higher, at 19%.
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Estimation and testing
Suppose we would like to know whether the labor market is getting more or less segmented between any two sectors over time: say, formal sector wage employment vs.
informal sector employment. One way of investigating this is to see if the probability that anyone who starts out in the informal sector in year 1 − t will have remained in the same sector in year t has increased, decreased, or remained the same over time. The more mobile are workers across any divide, the poorer is status at time 1 − t as a predictor of status at time t . A way of measuring changes in the degree of segmentation is therefore to use changes over time in the extent of state dependence in sector choice. In doing so
we leave open the possibility that mobility costs are state dependent in the sense, for example, that prospective entrants to formal sector or public sector employment might have to migrate from elsewhere at significant transport costs, while similar costs could be sunk or entirely absent for those already in those sectors. We also allow for the possibility of sector "scarring effects" as defined below as well as for skill formation and skill depreciation rates to vary by labor market state. As already noted, any of these factors would affect the rate of inter-sectoral mobility and, consequently, result in true state dependence in sector choice, but is not part of what defines market segmentation.
In estimating the degree of state dependence based on our sample, we assume that the current distribution of individuals in terms of belonging to a sector or not is generated by the process
it it y it X y where y y ε δ β 16 Looking at transitions in the reverse direction, some 12 per cent of those who were working for private firms in the 2000 sample had joined the public sector by 2004. Some 9.5% of informal sector employees and 3 % of self-employees in the same sample moved to the public sector over the same period. Again these rates are much higher than the negligible transition probabilities between 1994 and 1997, but are only a little higher than the rates for the period 1997-2000. it X is a vector of exogenous observable determinants of such status, it ε is a random variable summing up all unobservable influences on the same; β and δ are constants; and * it y is a latent variable registering a threshold value of comparative earnings or of utility governing individual's sector choice, or a critical value of a measure of entry barriers to which the choice is subject. Following most of the relevant empirical literature on labor market transitions, we assume that it ε is distributed normal with zero mean and constant variance 2 ε σ . There is state dependence in the process when 0 ≠ δ , so that the
In the present context we should expect δ to be positive in the event of its being different from zero. In that case a larger value of δ would imply greater state dependence in the sense that 1 − it y would be a stronger predictor of it y .
We use equation (1) otherwise. In the literature on unemployment, a larger value of δ could be a result of longer unemployment leading to loss of human capital through disuse, which would make the unemployed less attractive than the employed as job candidates (Pissarides, 1992) . It could also reflect the "scarring effect" of unemployment if prospective employers use unemployment history as a rule for screening out inferior workers (Arulampalam et al. 2002 , Phelps, 1972 . A third possibility is that getting a new job involves a fixed relocation or transport cost that becomes sunk once incurred. While each of these three scenarios is consistent with competitive labor markets, a higher δ could also be the result of segmentation, that is, a result of barriers of entry into employment on the part of the unemployed, due to employment protection laws, the exercise of insider power as in Lindbeck and Snower (1986) , or jobs being rationed via efficiency wage payment (as in Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; and Bulow and Summers, 1986) .
Likewise, state dependence in the sorting of workers between the informal and formal sectors could also arise from segmentation (by entry barriers to the formal sector) or from any one of the three "competitive" sources of state dependence listed above for the case of unemployment. If we let 1 = it y when i is an informal sector worker, and 0 = it y otherwise, a larger value of δ could reflect the fact higher barriers of entry to the formal sector arising from the protection of formal sector jobs by law or via insider power, or some combination of formal sector efficiency wage payment (Stiglitz, 1974) and search costs of formal sector jobs (Fields, 1975) in a Harris-Todaro setting (Harris and Todaro, 1970) . This would be the segmentation scenario. Alternatively, a large δ might simply be caused by the fact that staying in the informal sector involves loss of skills relevant to formal sector employment or has some kind of scarring effect similar to that associated with unemployment, or because the informal sector workers would have to incur reallocation costs to formal sector jobs.
Similarly, a higher value of δ could reflect higher entry barriers to the public sector if equation (1) describes the allocation of workers between that sector and private firms.
Public sector jobs are probably more often life time jobs than private sector jobs in many low-income economies. At the same time their availability for new entrants to the labor force is limited by government finances.
Given any of the three binary sector choice situations discussed above, we would have no way of telling what component of the δ we might estimate for any of them reflects segmentation and what part does not. We can nonetheless tell if segmentation has increased, decreased or remained the same along any of the dichotomies by estimating δ over the various segments of the survey decade under an identifying assumption.
Specifically, we assume that the distribution, across sectors, of mobility costs, skill formation/depreciation rates, scarring effects, and other possible 'competitive' sources of state dependence across sectors does not change over the period of interest, so that the share of δ that we can attribute to these sources is constant over time. A fall in the degree of state dependence in sector choice would then indicate decline in segmentation while an increase in the same would mean greater segmentation.
However, this is only one aspect of the problem of identification that we face in trying to estimate equation (1). Segmentation or not, our estimate of δ as a measure of true state dependence in general would be consistent only if the initial values, 0 i y , of labor market states as observed at the start of the survey are exogenous (Heckman, 1981 (Stewart, 2005 MLEs of parameters of (1) would be biased for any finite time series length, T, of the panel under the assumption of fixed effects. On the other hand, MLEs of parameters of
(1) are consistent as the cross-section size, N, tends to infinity for given series length if individual effects are random (Heckman, 1981) .
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Treating i c as random effects in turn amounts to assuming that they are uncorrelated with observable influences on 
Again the likelihood is maximized by treating i a as random effects.
Because it is easier to implement than Heckman's estimator, we use Wooldridge's estimator. It turns out that the results that we obtain are quite similar to those we get by using a two stage procedure proposed by Arulampalam, Booth and Taylor (2000) . 20 The procedure estimates in two steps Heckman's specification (Heckman, 1981) as given by
equations (1) to (4) 
We can test for the endogeneity of initial conditions based on Wooldridge's estimator by testing for the statistical significance of 0 π in equation (5). The corresponds to the test for the statistical significance of 1 b in equation (6) in the context of the two-step estimator. Since endogeneity is controlled for in each case, the estimate of δ we obtain by maximizing the log likelihood of the ample according to either equation should be consistent for true state dependence in choice into the labor market state of interest. In order to assess the merit of the two estimators relative to estimates from maximum likelihood estimates of a simple dynamic probit, or a traditional random effects probit that would assume the exogeneity of initial conditions, we have estimated equations (5) and (6) ξ is a zero mean iid error term orthogonal to pay gaps and to it Z 1 . The proposition that workers' sector choice and mobility decisions depend on pay gaps can be tested by estimating equation (8) and testing for the statistical significance of 1 a . More importantly in the present context, an increase in 1 a over time would suggest that segmentation has increased in the sense that mobility has become more and more sensitive to sectoral earnings gaps. Conversely, if segmentation grows over time in the sense that workers have become less responsive to pay gaps this should be reflected in 1 a diminishing over time.
A problem that has to be tackled in trying to estimate 1 a on the basis of (8) The counterfactuals that one would compute based on the OLS estimation of equations (9) and (10) 
where the hat symbol indicates estimates based on the estimation of (9b) and (10b).
State dependence in sector choice
The most important finding emerging from our estimates of dynamic binary sector choice models is that, while there has always been state dependence along the three divides of Ethiopia's urban labor market, it has grown significantly smaller over the survey decade. The estimates show that the probability of being in any one of the four sectors during a particular survey wave is higher for those who were in that state in the preceding wave, but this effect of last-period state on current choice has grown weaker in more recent waves. We interpret this as evidence that the rate of inter-sectoral mobility has increased over the years.
Details of the finding are reported in tables 4, 5 and 6, where we estimate a dynamic probit for each of the four labor market states. The probit for informal employment is estimated under alternative definitions, namely, one in which we equate informal sector employment with self-employment, and a second in which the category also includes those who work for others under informal wage contracts. In the first panel of table 4, we estimate a dynamic probit for each of the four labor market states on observations pulled across all five waves on the assumption that there are no unobserved individual effects and that the initial labor market state observed in the first wave of the survey is exogenous. Since neither is necessarily true in the light of the discussion in section 4, what we are reporting in the panel are estimates of a baseline model rather than estimates of the true data generating process.
Indeed we do show that neither assumption is correct in table 5 with respect to our data. Table 5 is also where we compare the results of addressing the initial condition problem using the Wooldridge's estimator and the two step estimator. As part of implementation of the latter we estimate a simple probit model of employment status at the time of the 1994 wave of the survey and report it in the second panel of table 4. As a selectivity equation, this is identified by including family background variables in it having excluded them from the first panel and from the specifications in tables 5 and 6. The underlying assumption is that these variables affect current status only in as far as they influence initial conditions. It turns out that both paternal occupation and maternal occupation are significant influences on initial conditions. Interestingly, individuals whose fathers owned non-farm businesses were less likely to be to be found in the public sector in 1994, but they were also less likely to be unemployed, as they were more likely to be self-employed or to work for someone else in informal contracts. Also, maternal occupation did not seem to influence the chances of initial public sector employment. Those who had working mothers were more likely to be unemployed as they were less likely to work in the informal sector as employees or as own account workers. Surprisingly, parental education seems to be only weakly correlated with initial labor market status.
The level of own education does influences the same status. Notably, those who had secondary education as the highest level of schooling were more likely to be unemployed in 1994 than those who had less schooling than that and those who had some tertiary education. This is in spite of the fact that there was no significant correlation between education and public sector employment, and reflects the fact that the more educated were less likely to be found in the informal sector or in self-employment at the time.
Nevertheless, the public sector attracted the more skilled than the private sector in 1994 while informal sector employment was associated with lower skills, when skills are measured in terms of broad occupation groups. Gender and age were also significant factors in sector choice in 1994. In particular, women were more likely to be selfemployed. Public sector employment and self-employment were also positively correlated with age, while the unemployed were predominantly in the 15-29 age group. 1994-1997. 21 On the assumption that the combined effect of competitive sources of true state dependence of sector choice has not changed significantly over the survey decade in all three cases, the observed fall in the persistence parameters over the same period can only indicate weakening segmentation if there are indeed entry barriers to formal sector employment in Ethiopia.
Earnings gaps and sector choice
We now turn to our second approach to gauging changes in the degree of segmentation, which is estimating the sensitivity of sector choice to sectoral earnings gaps. In tables 7, 8, and 9 we report results of estimation of a structural mode (equation 8b) of the sorting of workers between the public and private sectors of wage employment. In column 4 of Tables 8 and 9 are in similar to table 7 in content, in terms of underlying specification and identification and estimation methods. Table 8 reports results of estimation on data on wage earners in the 2000 survey sample who were also covered in the 1994 survey. Table 9 relates to wage earners of the 1997 wave who were also covered in the 1994
wave.
In table 10 the focus is on the estimation of a structural model of the sorting of workers between formal sector wage employment and informal employment. Here too the assumed structure is given by equation 8b. Since there are practically no earnings data for informal sector wage workers, we have been forced to confine the analysis to data on formal sector wage workers and own account workers reporting business sales revenue.
We use the latter as a proxy for earnings from self employment. What we refer to in the table as self-employment earnings premium is in fact the log difference between annual business revenue and the counterfactual annual wage, which we assume to be monotonically increasing in the true gap between earnings from self-employment and wages. The equations we estimate in table 10 are very similar to those of tables 7 to 9 except that we do not include a common earnings equation across the two divides in the case of table 10. The sector-specific earnings equations are identified and estimated in the same way in both sets of tables, as are the underlying reduced form selection equations.
Looking at the coefficients of the public sector dummy of the third column of tables 7 through to 9, we see that there has been a sizeable public sector wage premium throughout the survey decade, which, if anything, has been growing over time. The implied public sector premium (at the mean of the wage distributions) was 49 % for 2004 as compared to 40% for the year 2000 wave, and 32% for 1997. However, the coefficients of the public sector wage premium in the last columns of the three tables also suggest that the premium has become an increasingly more powerful driver of selection into public sector employment. Other things being the same, this would indicate diminishing segmentation over time, which is consistent with what we see both in terms of increase in raw transition rates and in the form of diminishing state dependence in selection into the public sector.
It should perhaps be stressed that the public sector premium is computed over and above possible sector differences in rates of return to schooling and to market experience. It turns out that in spite of the positive public sector premium, the rate of return to observed human capital-i.e., to schooling and experience-was higher in the private sector in the 2000 wave. This was reversed quite drastically in the 2004 wave of the survey, for which public sector rates of return were significantly higher. This was in addition to the 49 percent residual public sector pay premium.
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Turning to table 10, the key finding that emerges from it is that engagement in the informal sector is the outcome of active choice based on comparative advantage for at least for some proportion of those found in the sector. The evidence for this is that the This role of comparative advantage in informal sector employment could be concealed by the fact that schooling is negatively correlated with selection into self-employment. 22 We should hasten to add that this result applies to comparison at the mean of the distributions. It probably is the case that the public sector premium gets more pronounced towards the lower end of the distribution, but turns increasingly negative as we moved to upper quintiles.
However, it also turns out that the rate of return to education in informal sector employment that we read from the three tables is comparable to that of the formal sector. In other words, while the less educated have greater propensity for selfemployment, the more educated are more successful among the self-employed.
Conclusion
Based on data from the Ethiopia Urban Household Socio Economic Survey over the period 1994 to 2004, this paper has assessed the extent to which the structure of the urban labor market has changed over the same period. Specifically, we have looked at what has happened to entry rates to the public and the formal sectors of the labor market and to sectoral earnings premiums over the survey period, as well as to the sensitivity of inter-sectoral mobility to earnings gaps. Our data show a large, persistent and unexplained public sector wage premium. However, the sensitivity of sector choice to earnings gaps has become more pronounced, not only in relation to the public vs. private sector divide, but also vis-à-vis the formal and informal sector dichotomy. In particular, the role of comparative earnings in selection into the informal sector has increased in recent years. The rate of workers' mobility has also increased between the two pairs of sectors since the late 1990s as indicated by sample transitions rates. More importantly, state dependence in sector choice has decreased. In other words, the fact that we observe a randomly chosen individual in a given labor market state today is becoming a less and less powerful predictor of the probability that the individual will be found in the same state at a future date. Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
